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NOTES AND COMMENT
LIMIT op BEQUET BY NUNCUPATIVE WILL IN THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON.--SeC. 1406, Remp. Stat., is as follows:
"No nuneupative will shall be good when the estate
bequeathed exceeds the value of two hundred dollars
($200) unless the same be proved by two witnesses who
were present at the making thereof, and if it be proven
that the testator, at the time of pronouncing the same, did
bid some person present to bear witness that such was his
will, or to that effect, and such nuncupative will was made
at the time of the last simkness. Nothing herein contained
shall prevent any mariner at sea or soldier in the military
service from disposing of his wages or other personal
property by nuncupative will. No real estate shall be de-
vised by nuncupative will"
In construing this section as it was worded prior to 1917, our
Supreme Court, in Irwin v. Rogers," held that real estate cannot
pass by nuncupative will, and at the next following session of the
legislature, in re-enacting this section as a part of the new Probate
Code, the words "No real estate shall be devised by nuncupative
will" were added.2 *While the former uncertainty concerning the
191 Wash. 284, 157 Pac. 690, L. R. A. 1916 E, 1130 (1916).
'Laws 1917, Ch. 156, sec. 36; Rem. Comp. Stat, sec. 1406.
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operation of the section on real estate was thus removed, both by
judicial construction and legislation, the section remains ambiguous
as to the value of personal estate that may be bequeathed by this
class of will.
"No nuncupatsve will shall be good when the estate bequeathed
exceeds the value of two hundred dollars ($200) unless the same be
proved by two witnesses who were present at the maktng thereof,"
etc. We may have to ask ourselves two questions (1) Did the
legislature intend to make it legally possible to bequeath vast
estates in personal property by oral will? If we answer that the
words of the statute seem to so indicate, then (2) Was it intended
that bequests not exceeding two hundred dollars in value might
thus be made, without compliance with any of the requrements set
forth after the word "unless"? In other words, was it intended
that as to such smaller bequests the requirement of two witnesses,
and the calling on some person present to bear witness to the
spoken words as testator's will, and that such will was made M
the last sickness, should all be dispensed with?
In the effort to ascertain the legislative intent, the history of this
section of our law discloses that the present ambiguity and seem-
ing absurdity found in the language used, came about from the
dropping of a single word-'nor." When the section was first
enacted in Oregon Territory (from which the Territory of Wash-
ington was afterwards carved), Sept. 26, 1849, it was in these
words:
"No nuncupative will shall be good when the estate
bequeathed exceeds the value of two hundred dollars
($200) nor unless the same be proved by two witnesses
who were present at the making thereof, and it be proven
that the testator, at the time of pronouncing the same, did
bid some person present to bear witness that such was Ins
will, or to that effect, and such nuncupative will was made
at the time of the last sickness and at the dwelling house
of the deceased, or where he had been residing for the
space of ten days or more, except when such person -was
taken sick from home and died before his return. Nothing
herein contained shall prevent any mariner at sea or sol-
dier in the military service from disposing of his wages
or other personal propprty by nuncupative will.'a
With the word "nor" included, as in the section just quoted,
that section is simple, easily and perfectly understood and in entire
3 JOURNALS AND LAws OF OREGoN, 277, see. 23.
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conformity to the common law conception of nuncupative wills
after the masses of the people had learned to read and write, though
it is true that in the very early periods of the common law, wills
of personal property could be made by spoken words, very infor-
mally expressed and proved. The section remained in this form
for many years after the Territory of Washington was organized.
It was re-enacted without change in the Code passed at the first
session of our territorial legislature.4 With the adoption of the
"Probate Practice Act," in 1860, it was re-enacted verbatim, 5 but
in our territorial "Code of 1881,'"6 the word "nor," immediately
following the words "two hundred dollars," disappeared. Whether
this was by accident or design may now be immaterial, but in
view of the obvious ambiguity resulting and the seeming lack of
authority in the compiler or codifier to change the existing law-
a matter which will be further considered later on in this paper
-it is not improbable that the word was omitted through an un-
noticed typographical error. However that may be, the present
uncertainty will remain until the section has been restored to its
original form, or the defect otherwise remedied by legislation, or
possibly by judicial construction, should the question be presented.
It should be noted here that tis section was amended in the
Probate Code of 1917 Jthe omission of the word "nor" being con-
tinued. Moreover, substantial changes were made in the section
by the draftsmen of the 1917 Probate Code, indicating that the
section was individually reconsidered and that what was originally
possibly a mere oversight, was perhaps advisedly adopted by the
1917 re-enactment. As re-enacted the provision to the effect
that nuncupative wills must have been "made at the.time of the
last sickness, and at the dwelling house of the deceased, or where
he had been residing for the space of ten days or more, except
where such person. was taken sick from home and died before his
return," was changed by dropping all after the words "last sick-
ness." The provision for mariners and soldiers was preserved,
and, as stated, the section as to the point under consideration, was
left as before.
In considering the former ambiguity of the section as to real
property, our Supreme Court gave the section, and clearly ex-
pressed an intention to give it, the meaning which nuncupative
I LAws oF 1854, p. 315, "A Code Relating to Wins," see. 23.5 LAws 1859-60, p. 171, sec. 3L
I Sec. 1329.
TLAws 1917, Ch. 156, sec. 36; Rem. Comp. Stat, se. 1406.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
wills had at the common law.8 Perhaps as clear opportunity to
do that does not present itself in disposing of the question. under
consideration, nevertheless, it would seem, in view-of the solicitude
shown by the legislature in the very careful enactment of provisions
for written wills of estates, "real and personal," that it must be as-
sumed that in making provision for nuncupative wills it was the
intent to provide for emergency cases and to limit to a nominal
sum the value of personal property which can be thus lawfully
bequeathed, in accordance with the well-settled practice at the
common law.9
Nuncupative wills are not favored in the law. In the leading
American case, Prvnce v. Hazleton,"° Chancellor Kent gives a com-
preliensive history of the origin of this class of wills, and expresses
the hope " to see one day a law, that no nuncupative will
should be valid in any case." The books and decisions abound
with the statement that these wills are never to be favored. All
writers agree that they have become obnoxious to modern policy,
and by the terms of the English Statute of Wills they were made
invalid, except as to soldiers and sailors. The policy of this coun-
try, as disclosed by legislation, has been to continue this privi-
'Irwn v. Rogers, supra, note 1.
'Of this class of wills it is said in 1 SCHOutER Ox WrLLs, EX. AND
AD.RnS. (6th Ed.) sections 431-2: "This oral will is usually designated at
our law by the term 'nuncupative, which we borrow, like the testament
of this character, from the Roman civilians. A nuncupative will is an
oral will declared by the testator before witnesses, and afterwards re-
duced to writing. The law supposes such a will to be made in extrems
or under circumstances fairly equivalent, such as prevented him from
executing a more formal one. We shall see presently, however, that the
instances are very rare where testaments of this description are by our
modern English-inspired codes allowed any legal validity those exceptions
being specified by the local statute itself. Nuncupative wills are at com-
mon law oral acts performed with testamentary intent and sufficiently
intelligible to permit a finding of their scope, with the execution proved
by two witnesses."
"In the ancient days of our common law, and before the general cul-
tivation of letters, the doctrine of nuncupative wills appears to have main-
tained a firm footing. Derived originally from the Roman jurisprudence,
it was incorporated into our Anglo-Saxon system, and acted upon proprzo
vigore, long before the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills. Accord-
ing to the Institutes of Justinian, if one wished to dispose of his effects
by what our common law denominates a nuncupative or unwritten test-
ment, he might do so by a verbal declaration in the presence of seven
witnesses. No immediate reduction to writing of such a testament appears
to have been necessary, but thb. disposition might rest in parol proof until
after the testator's death; though such was not always the case. It was
sufficient if the witnesses, within a reasonable time after the death of the
testator, went before a magistrate, and gave an account of what took place;
a formal statement being then drawn up and signed, the proof of the wiU
was perpetuated."
1020 Johns. (N.Y.) 353 (1822).
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lege to soldiers and sailors, and in many of the states to extend it
to others tn extremts or during the last sickness, but to limit tn a
nominal sum the amount or value of personal property that can
be thus bequeathed.
From a reasonably comprehensive examination of the legisla-
tion in this country11 it will be seen that, except in the five states
which permit bequests up to $1000, "where there is an expecta-
tion of death from muries received the same day," the plain trend
of legislation has been to limit the amount to a nominal sum. It
will be noticed, too, that some of the states appear to have the
same ambiguity in their statutes that appears in ours.
There does not appear to have been any decision on the point in
this state, though in In re Sullivan's Estate, 2 it was contended
that a nuncupative will is ineffective when the estate bequeathed
exceeds in value the sum of $200, but the court found it unneces-
sary to pass upon the question. In Brown v. State,"3 it was said in
the opinion that nuncupative wills are not favored in law and
they must conform strictly to the statute. In Irwin v. Rogers,
supra, our court said.
"We are clearly of the opinion that the legislature did
not intend to change the common law relative to nuncu-
pative wills, and that until it does so in unmistakable
language, real estate cannot be devised under such a will."
This expression is, of course, to be taken with respect to the
'In many of the states there may be found the same statute that we
inherited from Oregon. Thus, in Alabama and Arkansas bequest is lim-
ited to $500; in California, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South
Dakota, it is limited to $1000, but "the decedent must have been at the
time in expectation of immediate death from an injury received the same
day"- Illinois, no specified limit; Indiana, $100; Iowa, $300; Kansas, no
stated limit; Kentucky, soldiers and sailors only- Maine, $300, unless
three witnesses; Massachusetts, soldiers and sailors only- Michigan, $300,
provided proved by two competent witnesses; Minnesota, soldiers and
sailors only- Mississippi, $100; Missouri, $200, nor at all unless two wit-
nesses; Nebraska, $150, unless three witnesses; New York, soldiers and
sailors only- Georgia, real and personal property, without limit, under
certain conditions specified; Oregon, soldiers and sailors only- Pennsyl-
vania, personal estate, but only when testator m extremis, or overtaken
by sudden and violent sickness, and by reason of the near approach of
death there is neither time nor opportunity for testator to execute a
written will; Rhode Island, soldiers and sailors only- South Carolina, $50,
unless proved by three witnesses at the least; Tennessee, $250, unless two
witnesses; Texas, $30, unless three witnesses; Vermont, $200, but not at
all unless at least one witness; soldiers . d sailors also; Virginia and
West Virginia, soldiers and sailors only- Wisconsin, $150, unless three
witnesses.
240 Wash. 202, 82 Pac.'297 (1905).
U87 Wash. 44, 151 Pac. 81 (1915).
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question there involved, nevertheless, it has bearing upon the
principle here discussed.
Recurring briefly to the history of the adoption of the "Code
of 1881," while it may be of little or no importance in view of
the legislative adoption of this and other subsequent codes con-
taining the section considered, it is submitted that there does not
appear to have been any legislative approval or knowledge of the
omission of the word "nor," and, further, it is doubtful that the
code commissioner under "An act to provide for the Codification
of the Laws of Washington Territory" 14 had authority to make
the change.
A study of the Codification Acti" reveals that while the word
"revise " was used in connection with the -word "codify," it seems
very clear, both from the title of the act and from the entire sec-
tion 2, that the legislature did not delegate to the code commis-
sioner power to make omissions in valid laws, and especially omis-
sions causing a vital change in the very substance of the law, but
that, in this respect, he was only to "make such alterations and
amendments as shall reconcile all contradictions, correct and sup-
ply omissions in figures, letters, words and sentences." In other
words, he was to codify the laws. The constructions placed on
the Code of 1881 by the court seem to support this view.18 But,
"Section 1 of "An Act to provide for the Codification of the Laws of
Washington Territory," appointed a code commissioner. Section 2 was in
these words: "The said code commissioner herein appointed is hereby
authorized and required to collect and thoroughly revise and codify an
the statute laws of the Territory of Washington which are, or may be in
force, at the close of the present session of the legislature. For thZ8 pur-
pose it is hereby made the duty of said code commissioner so to group
together all correlative and similar statutes, classifying and arranging
the various subjects under appropriate titles, to bring together and cor-
rectly incorporate the various amendments into the original acts, reject-
ing all repealed, redundant, inoperative and obsolete sections, laws or
parts of laws, and furthermore, to iake such alterations and amendment8
as shall reconcile all contradictions, correct and supply oamsson sr
figures, letters, words and sentences; and to do and perform all other
needful acts as shall enable the said code commissioner effectually to
reduce and bring into a written, intelligible and systematic form, the
statute laws of this territory, and to make such additions as may be
thought necessary for a complete and perfect code for the Territory of
Washington." (The italics are ours.)
" See note 14.
"afarston v. Humes, 3 Wash. 267, 28 Pac. 250 (1891) Littell and
Smythe Mfg. Co. v. Miller 3 Wash. 480, 28 Pac. 1035 (1892) in which the
following provision of the Code of 1881 is referred to: "The provisions cf
this code, so far as they are substantially the safae as existing statutes,
must be construed as continuations thereof and not as new enactments;"
State ex rel. Christie v. Meek, 26 Wash. 405, 67 Pac. 76 (1901), in which it
is held that the omission of a certain statute from the Code of 1881 did not
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assuming, as perhaps we must, that it is now too late to question
the legality of the omission of the word "nor," still the ambiguity
remains.
The writer has found no case where the exact point here raised
has been decided, but, in view of the general policy of lawmakers
to safeguard the property of deceased persons by closing the door
against opportunity for frauds and perjuries, easily arising out
of the indiscriminate privilege of disposing of unlimited values
in personal estates, by nuncupative will made in the last sickness,
and of a similar policy on the part of the courts, voiced in an
unbroken line of decisions going back more than a hundred years
in this country, it may well be doubted if our legislature ever in-
tended to permit greater value than $200 in personal property to
be bequeathed by oral will. But for this unaccountable disap-
pearance of the word "nor" from our present section 1406 Rem.
Comp. Stat., no such bequest could be made. That is certain. Nor
could it be made for the smaller amount, in value, unless in the
last sickness and calling upon some person to bear witness that the
spoken words were intended by testator for his will, and proof of
these facts by two witnesses. As it now stands, the law actu;lly
appears to permit the owner of personal property to bequeath by
oral will, all that he has, though perhaps millions of dollars in
value, by conforming to the stated requirements of the section.
If it be suggested that the Probate Code was intended to cover the
whole subject17 and thus perhaps leave no room for the common
law, then we have the absurd result that as to bequests in the
smaller amounts it makes no requirement as to the rogatio testium,
none as to any witness or witnesses, nor is the making required to
be in the last sickness! It is not believed that the legislature at
any time has intended to sponsor such a situation.
We have stated the legal riddle. Its solution lies with the legis-
lature or the courts. IVAN W GOODNER.
effect its repeal in view of a special provision in that code to the effect that
"All acts or parts of acts of a general nature, in force at the commence-
ment of the 8th biennial session of the legislative assembly, and not re-
pealed shall be, and the same are hereby continued, in full force and effect,
unless the same be repugnant to the act upon the same subject matter,
passed or revised at the 8th biennial or present extra session of the legis-
lature;" In re Donnellan, 49 Wash. 461, 95 Pac. 1085 (1908), see also Sjpo-
kane P & S. R. Co. v. Franklin Co., 106 Wash. 21, 179 Pac. 113 (1919)
Duke v. Amercan Casualty Co., 130 Wash. 210, 226 Pac. 501 (1924).
27Of. First Security d Loan Co. v. Englehart, 107 Wash. 86, 181 Pac.
13 (1919).
